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LEGITIMATION: THE LIBERAL JUDICIAL TREND IN
CALIFORNIA
Legitimation "is a legislatively established process whereby once
the father fulfills certain statutory conditions, the bastard's legal
status becomes that of a child born in wedlock."' In California, although an illegitimate child inherits from and through his mother as
if he were legitimate,2 before he can inherit from and through his
father either his parents must intermarry 3 or he must be legitimated
according to section 230 of the Civil Code. 4 In addition, an illegitimate child may inherit from his father without intermarriage of his
parents if his father acknowledges him in writing according to one of
the provisions of section 255 of the Probate Code,5 but this is a limited
succession provision which only enables the bastard to inherit from
but not through his father.6
Society has gradually become more aware of the plight of the
illegitimate and today, in California, the courts are gradually stretching the protective cloak of section 230 of the Civil Code to cover more
and more bastards from the bare status of the illegitimate. The attitude throughout the United States towards illegitimates has grown
sympathetic, and, while California has enacted fairly liberal statutes,
the California courts have taken a very liberal position in protecting
the interests of bastards to the extent that they have exceeded the
literal bounds of the legitimation statute.7 Presented here is a discussion of the evolution of this liberal position and a recommendation
1 Note, Visiting Rights of a Putative Father, 31 Mo. L. REv. 561, 563
(1966).
2 CAL. PROB. CODE § 255.
3

CAL. Civ. CODE § 215 provides: "A child born before wedlock becomes

legitimate by the subsequent marriage of its parents."
4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 230 provides in part:
"The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his
own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into
his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby
adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. .. ."

5 CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 provides:
"Every illegitimate child, whether born or conceived but unborn, in the
event of his subsequent birth, is an heir of his mother, and also of the person
who, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges
himself to be the father, and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as
the case may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock; but he does not represent his father by inheriting any part of the estate
of the father's kindred, either lineal or collateral, unless, before his death, his
parents shall have intermarried, and his father, after such marriage, acknowledges him as his child, or adopts him into his family; in which case such child
is deemed legitimate for all purposes of succession. An illegitimate child may
represent his mother and may inherit any part of the estate of the mother's
kindred, either lineal or collateral."
6 Estate of De Laveaga, 142 Cal. 158, 75 P. 790 (1904) (construing former Cal. Civ. Code § 1387, now CAL. PROB. CODE § 255). See 1 THE CALIFORNIA
FAmI.Y LAWYER 762 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1962).
7 For a discussion of the power of the legislature to provide for legitimation, see Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945).
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that legislation be enacted to bring the statutes into accord with
current judicial and social policy.

The Early Law
At common law, a child born out of wedlock was regarded as
filius nullius,the son of nobody, and thus could not be the heir of anyone, not even his mother.8 He had no right to support from his parents 9 and, at best, was only a child of the people, filius populus.10
Unlike the present California law, at common law a bastard could not
be rendered legitimate by any subsequent act of the parents, such as
marriage, and was doomed to the status of bastard for life." As late
as 1840 an English court stated the law that: "[T]he rule of descent
to English land is that the heir must be born after actual marriage of
its father and mother ... this is a rule of positive inflexible nature,
applying to
and inherent in the land itself which is the subject of
2
descent.'

Reasons for the second-class treatment of illegitimate children at
common law are found in the English practice of monogomy and
belief in the sanctity of marriage, especially as influenced by the
church, and in a fear of fraudulent claims against a putative father.' 3
As one writer has phrased it:
It was natural that men, as legislators, would have limited their
accidental offspring's claim against them, both economically and in
terms of a family relationship, especially since the social status of the
illegitimate mother did not equal their own. Moreover, their legitimate wives had an interest in denying the illegitimate's claim on
their husbands since any such claim could be allowed only at the
expense of the legitimate family.14
Initially all American jurisdictions, with the exception of Connecticut, adopted the doctrine of filius nullius,15 and even as late as the
19th century, virtually every state maintained this harsh doctrine.' 6
Over the years, however, a sense of justice has arisen and
the view of the common law has given way in large measure to the
concept that the onus for the act of the parents cannot be visited
justly upon the child and that placing responsibility for the support
of the child upon the father equally with the mother, permitting it to
become legitimated and to have a right to his name and to inheritance
from him, will tend as well or better to deter the potential father than
did the common law doctrine of irresponsibility, and at the same
time conform more closely to our present ideas of justice.17
8 Robbins & Deak, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study, 30 COLum. L. REv. 308, 316 (1930).
9 Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOxLY L. REV. 45, 46 (1959).
10 1 BLACKSTONE, CommFNrAmEs 459 (Chitty ed. 1845).
11 Id. at 455.
12 Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 7 Eng. Rep. 1308, 1322 (H.L. 1840).
13 Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate, 65 MIcu. L. REV. 477, 48993 (1967); Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 47 (1959).
14 Krause, supra note 13, at 498.

15 Note, Inheritance By, From and Through Illegitimates, 84 U. PA. L.
REV. 531 (1936).
16

Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76

REV. 337 (1962).
17

Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 480, 159 P.2d 643, 648 (1945).

HAav.
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Present Day Siatus of ihe Illegitimate
Today almost everywhere in the United States the illegitimate
child can be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents,
Except in two jurisdictions, the illegitimate child can inherit from his
mother as if born in wedlock, and he can usually inherit from his
mother's relatives. 19 However, only a minority of states permit him
to inherit from or through his father without being legitimated by
marriage, and virtually all of these states require a prior acknowledgment by the father. 20 Only in Arizona 2 1 and Oregon 22 has the
illegitimate child attained equal status with the legitimate as to inheritance rights.

California Law
In California every illegitimate child is an heir, as if born legitimate, of his mother; he "may represent his mother and may inherit
any part of the estate of the mother's kindred, either lineal or collateral. ' 23 However, the illegitmate child's right to inherit from24his
father is predicated upon his father's performance of certain acts in
accordance with statutory procedures. The California statutes provide three ways in which the illegitimate child can inherit from his
father.
(1) The child becomes an heir of his father if his father acknowl18

See statutes collected in Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BRooxLy

L. REV. 45,

85 (1959).
19 See statutes collected in Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45,

76-79 (1959). According to the note, New York and Louisiana permit inheritance from the mother only if she is not survived by lawful issue.
20

(1959).
21

See statutes collected in Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BRoox.LYN L. Rsv. 45, 85
Apaz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956) provides:

"(A) Every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is
entitled to support and education as if born in lawful wedlock, except that
he is not entitled to the right to dwell or reside with the family of his father,
if the father is married.
"(B) Every child shall inherit from its natural parents and from their
kindred heir, lineal and collateral, in the same manner as children born in
lawful wedlock."
22 ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.060 (1957) provides:
"The legal status and legal relationships and the rights and obligations
between a person and his descendants, and between a persorr and his parents,
their descendants and kindred, are the same for all persons, whether or not
the parents have been married."
ORE. REv. STAT. § 111.231 (1957) provides:
"In applying the laws of descent and distribution of this state, full effect
shall be given to all relationships as described in ORS 109.060."
23 CAL. PROB. CODE § 255.
24 In addition, CAL. Civ. CODE

§ 196a states that the father as well as the
mother of an illegitimate child is responsible for the support of the child and
provides for an action to enforce such responsibility. CAL. CIv. CODE § 231
provides for an action for declaration of paternity. However, "[a] judgment
declaring the defendant to be the father does not change the status of the
child as an illegitimate, even though the determination . . . is essential to
enforce the child's support rights." 1 THE CALIFoRNIA FAMILY LAWYER 757

(Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1962).

NOTES
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edges paternity in a writing before a competent witness. 25 Any informal writing suffices,26 and it "need not declare that the child
therein acknowledged is illegitimate.12 7 This method permits the
child to inherit from but not through his father; he still is not permitted to inherit from his father's kindred. Section 255 of the Probate
Code, which establishes this procedure is only a succession statute
and not a legitimation statute.28 However, the California courts have
said that the statute is to be 29liberally interpreted to facilitate inheritance by an illegitimate child.
(2) An illegitimate can inherit from and through his father if his
father and mother intermarry. 0 The marriage actually legitimates
the child for all purposes and gives him the rights of a legitimate
child, even if the parents marry after he reaches majority. 31
(3) Even if the parents of the illegitimate child do not intermarry, he can inherit from and through his father as if born in lawful wedlock if his father complies with the terms of section 230 of the
Civil Code and legitimizes his child,32 as discussed in detail below.
Section 230 of the California Civil Code

Section 230 of the California Civil Code is a particularly important statute since it gives an illegitimate child all the rights of a legitimate child without a marriage between his parents. The California
courts have come to favor a very liberal interpretation of the statutes

which provide for legitimation and inheritance by illegitimates, 33 and
lately, the courts have found the requirements of section 230 very
(1)
easily satisfied. 34 The requirements under this statute are four:
The legitimator must be the natural father of the child; (2) he must
publicly acknowledge that fact; (3) he must receive the child into his
family with his wife's consent; (4) he must otherwise treat the child
as legitimate.35
In 1889 Chief Justice Beaty, dissenting in Estate of Jessup,36 said:

25 CAL.PROB. CODE

§

255.

Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915 (1892) (letters to the child in
which the father referred to her as his daughter sufficed).
27 Estate of Loyd, 170 Cal. 85, 148 P. 522 (1915).
28 Estate of De Laveaga, 142 Cal. 158, 75 P. 790 (1904).
29 See, e.g., Estate of Loyd, 170 Cal. 85, 148 P. 522 (1915).
30 CAL. Civ. CODE § 215. Also, the issue of a marriage which is void or
annulled is legitimate. CAL. Civ. CODE § 85.
31 Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 P. 346 (1919).
32 See Estate of Garcia, 34 Cal. 2d 419, 210 P.2d 841 (1949), which clears
up the confusion due to the overlapping of CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 and CAL.
Civ. CODE § 230. The case holds that under section 255 there is no double
requirement of reception and intermarriage for legitimation. See also 38
CALiF. L. REV. 322 for a discussion of, Estate -of Garcia, supra.
33 See, e.g., Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 481-82, 159 P.2d 643, 648
(1945); Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915 (1892); Estate of Paterson, 34
26

Cal. App. 2d 305, 93 P.2d 825 (1939):

34 E.g., Hurst v. Hurst, 227 Cal. App. 2d 859, 39 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1964);
Estate of Peterson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 258, 29 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1963).
35 Wong v. Young, 80 Cal. App. 2d 391, 393, 181 P.2d 741, 743 (1947).
Accord, Estate of Flood, 217 Cal. 763, 21 P.2d 579 (1933). The text of CAL.
CIV. CODE § 230 is set out in note 4 supra.
36 81 Cal. 408, 434, 22 P. 742, 749 (1889).
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The only argument that can be made against his claim to inherit his
father's estate rests upon a strict construction of the statutes, remedial
in their nature, designed to secure to innocent unfortunates in his
situation a just share of the rights to which they are by nature as
fully entitled as are legitimate offspring ....
I adhere to the view
.. . that in cases of this kind the only strictness required is in proof
of paternity. That being satisfactorily established by plenary proof, I
think courts should lean strongly in favor of a finding that the father
of an illegitimate child has done what every honest and humane man
should be not only willing but
eager to do, and what a just law would
compel the unwilling to do. 37
In recent years the courts seem to have taken this approach to
heart. In the following paragraphs the judicial treatment of the requirements of section 230 are examined.
Public Acknowledgment
The courts have not actually strayed from the apparent meaning
of the "public acknowledgment" requirement. A father cannot hide
the fact of paternity from his relatives3 8 or maintain a clandestine
household 39 if a child is to be legitimated under section 230. The
courts have been quick to add, however, that no more is required than
public acknowledgment of paternity; there need be no acknowledgment of illegitimacy. 40 A 1958 case, Estate of Abate,41 seems to liberalize the usual acknowledgment requirement 42 that the father's
family be told of the existence of the illegitimate child. In Abate
the court found that a lack of communication to the family of the
father did not defeat legitimation when the father was concerned
about his own health (he died of cancer 15 days after the birth of the
child) and never was "called on" to discuss the child.4 3 In coming to
its decision in Abate the court called attention to the principle set out
in Estate of Gird44 that "[t] here is no provision as to what shall constitute a 'public acknowledgment,' and the words of the statute must
be taken in their ordinary sense. .. .
Reception into the Family
The family can consist of the man, his illegitimate children and
47
their mother, 46 or merely of the father and his illegitimate child.
Id. at 435, 22 P. at 750.
Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 223 P. 974 (1924); Estate of Jessup, 81
Cal. 408, 22 P. 742 (1899).
39 Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 223 P. 974 (1924).
40 Estate of Flood, 217 Cal. 763, 778, 21 P.2d 579, 584 (1933), where the
court said: "To require references to the child as illegitimate would, therefore, prevent legitimation and defeat the very object of the statute." Blythe
v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 589, 31 P. 915, 926 (1892), where the court said: "No
sound reason can be adduced why the acknowledgment should contain a declaration of bastardy."
41 166 Cal. App. 2d 282, 333 P.2d 200 (1958).
42 Prior decisions required that the father disclose paternity to his relatives. Cases cited note 38 supra.
43 Estate of Abate, 166 Cal. App. 2d 282, 290, 333 P.2d 200, 205-06 (1958).
44 157 Cal. 534, 108 P. 499 (1910).
45 Id. at 542, 108 P. at 503; Estate of Abate, 166 Cal. App. 2d 282, 288, 333
P.2d 200, 204 (1958).
46 Estate of Gird, 157 Cal. 534, 108 P. 499 (1910).
47 Estate of Jones, 166 Cal. 108, 115-16, 135 P. 288, 290 (1913); Darwin v.
Ganger, 174 Cal. App. 63, 72, 344 P.2d 353, 358 (1959).
37
38
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As early as 1892 in Blythe v. Ayres 48 the court held that if there is no
family proper into which a child could be received, the element of reception into the family is foreign to the case. In Blythe, the father
had never seen his child, but the fact that he had contributed to her
support and spoke proudly of her to all he knew satisfied the court
that the daughter had been legitimated.
Today the courts continue this nebulous concept of family home
into which a father may receive his child. In the recent case of
Hurst v. Hurst"9 the mere renting of an apartment in the name of
father, mother and child was enough to constitute a home into which
the child was received, although the child and his mother never entered the apartment. The court considered this sufficient reception
because the father did not have any other home. 50 In coming to this
conclusion the court was supported by several recent liberal decisions
which strained to satisfy the reception requirements of the statute. 51
In one of these cases the court found that occasional visits to the
father's house, never for longer than from noon to dusk, in addition to payment of $100 towards the illegitimate daughter's wedding,
were sufficient to constitute reception. 52 In another recent case the
court found that a father legitimated his unborn child by living with
its mother
until she left him-a few days before the birth of the
53
child.
The Hurst court, finally, called attention to Estate of Peterson54
where the court found the plaintiff legitimated by a few visits and
letters to her father after she had reached majority. In Peterson
the court found these acts sufficient to constitute reception because
"[i]t is apparent that few adults, however desirous they might be of
attaining a legitimate status, would be willing to abandon their own
families and leave their settled places of residence in order to achieve
this goal." 55 Indeed, in light of these cases, it is understandable that
the Hurst court aligned its decision with the prevailing liberal attitudes and
found adequate reception in the mere renting of an apart6

ment.

With the Consent of His Wife
Of course if a man has no wife this requirement is omitted;r5 - but
if the father has a wife from whom he is separated, a child cannot be
48

49
50

51

Lavell
Estate
52

96 Cal. 532, 592-93, 31 P. 915, 927-28 (1892).
227 Cal. App. 2d 859, 39 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1964).
Id. at 870, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
Estate of Peterson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 258, 29 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1963);
v. Adoption Institute, 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960);
of Wilson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 385, 330 P.2d 425 (1958).
Estate of Wilson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 385, 330 P.2d 425 (1958).
Lavell v. Adoption Institute, 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367

53
(1960).
54 214 Cal. App. 2d 258, 29 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1963).
55 Id. at 263, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
56 See

B. WTrI,

SumMARy OF

CALiFoN-A.LAW 845 (1965 Supp.): "The

requirement of reception into the family home, badly strained by Estate of
Peterson . ..has been virtually eliminated by Hurst v. Hurst...."
57 Serway v. Galentine, 75 Cal. App. 2d 86, 170 P.2d 32 (1946).
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legitimated without her consent. 58 In 1959 a federal court, construing
California law, anticipated a liberalization of this requirement and
held that in light of the recent liberal California decisions, consent of
the de facto wife in lieu of that of the legal wife was sufficient. 59 California courts, however, have maintained that the statute requires consent of the legal wife. 60 Nevertheless, in 1965, in Hurst v. Hurst,6' the
California appellate court devised an ingenious way to avoid the obstacle of consent. The court granted a nunc pro tunc decree at the
son's request so that his father's divorce would relate back prior to
the alleged acts of legitimation. In this way the father's legal wife
did not have to give her consent for the child to have been legitimated.
Thus, while California courts say that consent of the wife is required,
the Hurst decision indicates a willingness to liberalize this requirement of the statute.
Treat the Child as Legitimate
The standard for determining whether the child is treated as legitimate is the manner in which a parent would treat his legitimate
child.6 2 The test is somewhat subjective: the father need not necessarily treat the child as the majority of fathers would, but as he
would treat his own legitimate child. 63 The court has held that if
the father were to refer to him "as his illegitimate child, this would
,14
constitute a failure to treatthe child as legitimate ....
The Adoption Cases
Two recent cases do not liberally construe section 230. Both are
adoption cases and both interpret the reception requirement of the
statute.
In Guardianshipof Truschke,65 the father's consent to the adoption of his offspring by another was found not to be necessary, as he
did not legitimate the child merely by spending money and buying
clothes in expectation of its birth. The court said that this was not
constructive reception.6 6 In Adoption of Irby,67 the court held that
the father did not legitimate his child by acknowledging it and
trying to see it over the mother's objection. Perhaps these more
literal interpretations can be explained by the fact that they are
adoption cases involving very young natural fathers. Courts are
usually governed by what is in the best interest of the child."" As
the court said in Irby: "The resolution of the issues herein does not
require the application of the policy of the law which favors legitima58 Laugenour v. Fogg, 48 Cal. App. 2d 848, 120 P.2d 690 (1942).
59 McDaniel v. Flemming, 172 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
60 Adoption of Graham, 58 Cal. 2d 899, 377 P.2d 275 (1962); Darwin v.
Ganger, 174 Cal. App. 2d 63, 344 P.2d 353 (1959).
61 227 Cal. App. 2d 859, 39 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1965).
62 Estate of Gird, 157 Cal. 534, 108 P. 494 (1910).
63 Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915 (1892).
64 Estate of Flood, 217 Cal. 763, 778, 21 P.2d 579, 584 (1933).
65 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965).
66 Id. at 79, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
67 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1964).
68 Id. at 242, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (dictum).
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tion, since in any event the child will be legitimated, either by acknowledgment by its father under Civil Code, section 230, or by
adoption by the respondents."6 9

Conclusion
It is clear that California courts favor legitimation when legitimation is in the best interest of the child involved. The courts have
given the legitimation statute a very liberal interpretation 70 and have
recognized the interest of society in legitimation.71 The California
courts have gone far to see that the sins of the parents are not visited
upon the illegitimate child. Instead of straining the existing statutes
to their bursting points, however, why not enact a new and more
liberal legitimation statute? Perhaps the approach of Arizona and
Oregon deserves consideration. 2 In these two states the illegitimate
is treated as legitimate in all matters concerning property rights and
obligations; 73 and, technically, in Arizona there is no status of illegitimacy.74 After all, an illegitimate child is still the offspring of his
father, just as is his legitimate half-brother. Is there any reason why
he should be deprived of inheritance rights from his father because
he was his father's mistake?
In the opinion of one author, Harry D. Krause, such discrimination between the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children constitutes a violation of equal protection of the law. 715 Certainly, as
Krause points out, the basis for the class distinction is faulty. The
reasons given today for the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate are those which have been given throughout the ages: discouragement of promiscuity; protection of the family unit; and uncertainty of paternity. 76 Yet these arguments are easily refuted today. Statistics show that laws governing legitimacy have not protected the family unit and have not discouraged promiscuity. 77 In
fact, a statutory imposition of responsibility would probably be more
effective in discouraging promiscuity and protecting the family unit
69 Id. at 240, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
70 See, e.g., Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945); Blythe v.
Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915 (1892).
71 Davis v. Stroud, 52 Cal. App. 2d 308, 315, 126 P.2d 409, 412-13 (1942),
where the court stated that it is important to determine paternity so that the
father rather than society be required to support the child.
72 CAL. CIV. CODE § 230 was enacted in 1872 and was based on Cal. Stats.
1869-70, ch. 385, § 9, at 531. CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 was enacted in 1931 and
was based on former Cal. Civ. Code § 1387 and Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 96, § 2,
at 220. The Arizona statute, on the other hand, was enacted in 1956, and the
Oregon statute in 1957.
73 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 111.231, 109.060 (1957).
The text of these statutes
is set out in note 22 supra.
74 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956). The text of this statute is set
out in note 21 supra.
75 Krause, supra note 13.
76 Id. at 489-93.
77 For example, there were 7.1 illegitimate births per 1000 unmarried
women in the United States in 1940, and the rate increased to 23.4 births per
1000 unmarried women in 1964. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, STATxSTECAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

496 (1966).
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than are the present legitimacy laws.78 As to the problem of uncertainty of paternity, as long as there are careful means of establishing
paternity,7 9 that objection is not valid. Once paternity is established,
there is no reason the illegitimate child should not be admitted to the
rights of the legitimate.8 0
If fathers naturally feel less affection for their illegitimate offspring and do not wish to include them as heirs, they should disinherit
such children by will and should not be aided by the legislature. 81
As stated in Davis v. Stroud,8 2 it is in the interest of the public that
parents care for their children and not leave the responsibility to the
state. It is true that the illegitimate can obtain support from his
father through a support order which will last after the death of the
father and will be a claim against his estate.8 3 However, a support
order is only for the benefit of minor or incapacitated children 4 and
will not provide for an indigent adult who could have inherited from
his father. It is also possible that a minor child could be the recognized offspring of his father and yet never have obtained a support
order before the death of the father.8 5 Unless such child has been
legitimated under section 230 or has been acknowledged in writing
prior to the death of his father under California law he can expect
nothing from the estate of his father.
It is true that legitimate children and the wife of a deceased
father/husband would tend to be most annoyed at the appearance of
some unknown bastard at the moment the estate is to be settled.
However, the illegitimate child exists as the child of his father, and
there is no rational reason with modern blood tests"8 and the increasing incidence of fragmented families resulting from divorce to deny
him the full rights of the legitimate. 87 An illegitimate son is as much
78 See Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 480, 159 P.2d 645, 648 (1945)
(dictum).
79 An action for declaration of paternity is provided by CAL. Cw. CODE
§ 231. If a party refuses to submit to a court-ordered blood test in an action
where paternity is a relevant fact, the court may resolve the question of
paternity against that party. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 892. For a discussion of
blood tests and proof of facts in determining the issue of legitimacy, see Note,
Parent and Child: Blood Tests as Proof of Non-Parentage, 39 CALIF. L. REV.
277 (1951).

80 See Estate of Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 434, 22 P. 742, 749 (1889) (dissenting

opinion of Beaty, C.J.).
81 See Krause, supra note 13, at 498.
82 52 Cal. App. 2d 308, 315, 126 P.2d 409, 412-13 (1942).
83

DeSylva v. Ballentine, 96 Cal. App. 2d 503, 215 P.2d 780 (1950).

84 CAL. Civ. CODE § 241.
85 "Although many and perhaps most of them later acquire full citizenship by adoption or legitimation, there are those, and they probably still

count millions, who will never have a father; many of them because the
mother was permitted by the law to barter away the paternity suit." Ehrenz-

weig, The "Bastard"in the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. Car.
L. REV. 498, 500 (1962).
86 For a discussion of bloodtests and proof of facts in determining the
issue of legitimacy, see Note, Parentand Child: Blood Tests as Proof of NonParentage,39 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (1951).
87 "No excuse remains to continue the disabilities and moral prejudices
of another day at the expense of today's children and to perpetrate the an-
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a brother of the child of a present marriage as is the child of a previous
marriage. As long as the illegitimate is proved to be the child of the
man in question, the child should be entitled to the same treatment
as any other offspring of his father.
Suggested Statute
8s

The adoption cases give us some indication that a legitimate
status is not always the best solution for the plight of the illegitimate
child. Hence, perhaps a statute, such as that of Arizona, 89 which
makes all children the legitimate children of their natural parents,
is too broad. Possibly a detailed statute would be more flexible and
would better protect the interests of the child in each case. 90 A possible solution for California would be a codification of current judicial
ideas underlying the liberal cases:

(a) A child is the legitimate child of its mother for all purposes. He is the heir of his mother and represents his mother in
inheriting from her kindred, lineal or collateral.
(b) An illegitimate child becomes the legitimate child of its
natural father for all purposes, including inheritance from and
through his father if the court finds it in the best interest of the
child and if:
(1) The father acknowledges his relationship to the child
in writing; or
(2) The father and mother marry either prior to or after
birth, whether or not the marriage is later declared void for any
reason; or
(3) The father acknowledges the child as his own and
treats it as such; or
(4) The father's paternity is declared in a judicial proceeding for the establishment of that fact.9 1
Naomi G. Litvin*
cient double standard by force of law." Krause, Bringing the Bastard into
the Great Society, A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAS L. REv.
829, 859 (1966).
88 Guardianship of Truschke, 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1965); Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1964). See
text at notes 65-69 supra.
89 The text of the Arizona statute is set out in note 21 supra.
90 One author has suggested a detailed uniform act on illegitimacy, and
he maintains that such detailed provisions are preferable to the statutes of
Arizona and Oregon, because the proposed uniform provisions permit flexibility in avoiding legitimation when legitimation is not in the best interest of
the child. Krause, supra note 87, at 845.
91 CAL. CIV. CODE § 231, provides:
"An action may be brought for the
purpose of having declared the existence or nonexistence between the parties
of the relation of parent and child by birth or adoption." The child or the
mother may bring the action. Pasquale v. Pasquale, 219 Cal. 408, 27 P.2d 76
(1933).
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